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Evidence for the anticipation of environmental effects as an integral part of response plan-
ning comes mainly from experiments in which the effects were physically presented.Thus,
in these studies it cannot be excluded that effect codes were activated during response
preparation only because the effects were displayed as external stimuli before response
execution. In order to provide more clear-cut evidence for the anticipation of response
effects in action planning, we performed a series of three experiments using a new par-
adigm, where displaying effect codes before the response was avoided. Participants first
learned arbitrary effects of key-pressing responses. In the following test phase they were
instructed to execute a response only if a Go stimulus was presented after a variable stim-
ulus onset asynchrony (SOA).The Go stimulus was either compatible or incompatible with
the effect, but independent of the response. In Experiment 1 we tested the paradigm
with two responses and two effects. We found a significant compatibility effect: If the Go
stimulus was compatible with the response effect, responses were initiated faster than
in incompatible trials. In Experiment 2 response effects were only present in the acquisi-
tion phase, but not in the test phase. The compatibility effect disappeared, indicating that
the results of Experiment 1 were indeed related to the anticipation of the forthcoming
response effects. In Experiment 3 we extended this paradigm by using a larger number
of stimuli and response alternatives. Again we found a robust compatibility effect, which
can only be explained if the effect representations are active before response execution.
The compatibility effects in Experiments 1 and 3 did not depend on the SOA. The fact that
the Go stimulus affected response preparation at any time indicates that the role of effect
anticipation is not limited to response selection.
Keywords: action planning, effect anticipation, ideomotor theory, motor control
INTRODUCTION
Human motor behavior, when it is not reflexive, is typically car-
ried out to achieve goals. When we plan a movement we normally
have an environmental or sensory effect in our mind that we want
this movement to produce. This can either be in form of the phys-
ical movement itself, like in floor exercises or in dancing, or a
more distal effect like the creation of a new environmental state,
or the avoidance of an unpleasant situation. This leads to the ques-
tion how the environmental effects, or their representations, are
involved in the planning and control of movements.
Early theories of movement control indeed considered the
anticipation of the sensory effects of a movement as a prerequisite
to perform the movement. By randomly executing a movement,
the performer learns which sensations are connected with this
movement. The re-activation of the sensations will then produce
the same movement, or at least a corresponding movement ten-
dency (Herbart, 1824; Lotze, 1852; Harleß, 1861; James, 1890;
Münsterberg, 1888). James (1890) called this the ideomotor prin-
ciple. More modern versions of the ideomotor principle follow this
suggestion by assuming that voluntary responses or actions are
centrally represented by the sensory feedback that they produce,
i.e., by their effects (Greenwald, 1970; Prinz, 1983, 1997; Hommel
et al., 2001; Hommel, 2009; see also Stock and Stock, 2004; Pfister
and Janczyk, 2012 for an overview).
Also other theories of motor control consider the anticipa-
tion of action effects as an important component of the control
process, e.g., Schmidt’s (1975, 1988) Schema Theory and the more
recent concept of forward models in motor control (Davidson
and Wolpert, 2005; Wolpert and Flanagan, 2009). These theories
basically assume that that the sensory effects of a selected motor
response are anticipated in order to allow for the internal testing
of the programmed response, the monitoring of execution, and
the related error detection and correction.
Thus, theoretically it has been well established that action effects
play a crucial role in the selection, preparation, and execution
of motor actions. This theoretical emphasis has led to numerous
experiments trying to find evidence for the anticipation of effects
for the selection, internal test, and monitoring of motor responses
(see Nattkemper et al., 2010; Shin et al., 2010 for reviews). However,
it should be noted that a considerable part of this evidence comes
from experiments in which the effects were presented prior to
response execution. Obviously, an experimental setting in which
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response effects are physically present in the environment does
not have high ecological validity. Under normal conditions the
appearance of the effect in the environment would indicate the
successful completion of the response but not trigger its execu-
tion. The fact that advance presentation of an effect facilitates the
response could therefore be an artifact of the experimental sit-
uation. It could be that effect representations are only activated
because of the external stimulation and that participants only use
the effect information to select and prepare the required response
because it is already available.
In particular, this criticism applies to all paradigms in which
the response effects were used as imperative stimuli, or where
the response effects were presented together with the imperative
stimuli. A first paradigm of this kind is based on the theoretical
assumption that the acquisition of goal-directed actions follows a
two-stage process (Lotze, 1852; Hommel, 1996; Elsner and Hom-
mel, 2001). In the first stage, randomly executed movements are
associated with their effects. The association is assumed to be
bi-directional, so that in a second stage the activation of effect
representations automatically leads to the activation of the corre-
sponding movement that is needed to produce the effect. In their
experiments, Elsner and Hommel (2001) first let their participants
execute two key-presses that were followed by a low pitched or a
high pitched tone. In the second phase of the experiment the tones
were used as imperative stimuli in a forced-choice task. Responses
to the tone stimuli were faster if the tone-response assignment cor-
responded to the response effect relation from the first part of the
experiment. Similarly, if the second phase of the experiment was a
free-choice task, participants responded to a given tone more often
with the response that produced this tone beforehand, rather than
with the alternative response (see also, Pfister et al., 2011).
In a second paradigm to which our criticism also applies the
effects were presented simultaneously with the imperative stimu-
lus, and participants were instructed to ignore them. For example,
in some of our own experiments (Ziessler and Nattkemper, 2002,
2011; Ziessler et al., 2004) we adapted the flanker task (Eriksen
and Eriksen, 1974) to investigate the integration of effect anticipa-
tion in action planning. In an initial acquisition phase participants
performed key-pressing responses to letters that were followed by
other letters as effects. In the test phase participants performed
the same forced-choice reaction task, but now the effect letters
were presented as flanking stimuli on both sides of the imperative
stimulus. Responses were facilitated if the flanking letters were the
effects of the correct response to the imperative stimulus.
A third paradigm, which is less affected by our criticism, pro-
vides evidence that responses are facilitated if there is an over-
lap between features of the response and features of the effect
(Greenwald, 1970; Kunde, 2001, 2003; Kunde et al., 2004). The
experiments by Kunde and collaborators show, for example, that
spatial compatibility between the location of the response and
the location of the effect in a forced-choice reaction task facili-
tates the response. Also, if the intensity of the response (e.g., soft
or forceful key-presses) was compatible with the intensity of the
effect (e.g., loudness), or the durations of responses and effects
corresponded to each other, responses were facilitated. Kunde and
collaborators interpreted their findings of response effect com-
patibility, in analogy to activation models of stimulus-response
compatibility (Kornblum et al., 1990), via the assumption that the
feature overlap between responses and their effects leads to a facil-
itation of the responses. In line with the ideomotor principle, if
there is dimensional overlap between the response and the effect,
features of the effect can directly activate features of the response.
The advantage of this paradigm is that the effects are not physi-
cally presented before response execution. However, the evidence
is limited to situations in which responses and their effects show
a dimensional overlap. There are indeed instances outside of the
laboratory setting for such dimensional overlaps, for example, the
correspondence between the duration of a key-press and the dura-
tion of a tone, or between the force of a response and the force of
the effect. But in many other instances our movements do not
exhibit any feature overlap with the distal effects that they pro-
duce in the environment. For example, the movements that we
execute to bring up the letters on the computer screen have actu-
ally nothing in common with the letters; the movement to turn
a light switch has no features in common with the light that is
switched on.
The most convincing evidence for effect anticipation so far
comes from experiments that adopted a fourth paradigm. Kunde
et al. (2002) instructed their participants to prepare a response,
but in a number of critical trials they had then to switch to
another response. This switch could be performed faster when
both the originally cued response and the switched response pro-
duced the same effect. Kunde et al. (2002) argued that their results
show that effect codes become endogenously activated in response
preparation and that the activated effect representations are capa-
ble of also activating other responses that produce these effects.
To our knowledge, however, the advantage of switching between
responses that produce the same effect, as compared to responses
producing different effects, was only shown where tones were used
as effects. The production of tones might be a special case, and so
it is still unclear if those findings could be generalized to other
response effects.
In summary then, in a considerable number of the available
experiments on effect anticipation, the response effects themselves
were used as imperative or as flanker stimuli, which compromises
the interpretation of the results (see above). The two other exper-
imental paradigms used to date are less affected by our circularity
argument, but generalization of those findings is limited to situa-
tions where responses and effects show dimensional overlap (third
paradigm), or, at least to date, to tones as environmental effects
(fourth paradigm).
With the present series of experiments we devised a new para-
digm, which neither includes the physical presentation of response
effects nor relies on a feature overlap between responses and their
effects. Basically, we used an indirect priming paradigm in which a
stimulus presented during response preparation has the potential
to interact with the effect of the response, provided the response
effect is indeed activated at this point in time. The experiments
started with an acquisition phase, where participants learned that
their responses produced particular, arbitrarily assigned effects.
The following test phase was designed as a Go/No-Go task. Partic-
ipants were instructed to prepare a response, but they should only
perform the response after a Go stimulus was presented. The iden-
tity of the Go stimuli had no relationship to the responses, but they
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were either compatible or incompatible with the response effect.
Because the Go stimuli do not provide any information regard-
ing the required response, they can only affect the response via
their relationship to the response effects. Therefore, if the effect
compatibility of the Go stimuli would affect the reaction times
(RTs), this would convincingly demonstrate that effect codes have
functional relevance for the preparation of the responses.
The aim of the first experiment was to test this paradigm using
just two responses, two effects, and two Go stimuli. We predicted
that effect-compatible Go stimuli would support the activation
of the response-related effect code and that this would, in turn,
facilitate the response, in comparison to effect-incompatible Go
stimuli. There are at least two different hypotheses how a facilita-
tion of the effect anticipation could result in faster responses. If
effect codes were used for response selection (Elsner and Hommel,
2001; Hommel et al., 2001; Kunde et al., 2002) an early activation
of the effect representation should lead to a faster response. If the
activation of effect representations is part of the preparation of an
already selected response (Schmidt, 1975, 1988; Ziessler and Nat-
tkemper, 2011), then the additional activation of the effect by the
compatible Go stimulus would shorten the process of response
preparation, and consequently reduce the RTs. In an attempt to
distinguish between these two hypotheses, we varied the stimulus
onset asynchrony (SOA) between the imperative stimulus and the
Go stimulus in the test phase. The first hypothesis would predict
stronger compatibility effects for shorter SOAs, whereas the sec-
ond hypothesis would either predict the opposite effect, indicating
an increasing role of effect anticipation in later stages of response
preparation, or no interaction between compatibility and SOA.
With the second experiment we wanted to assess whether the
presence of the response effects in the test phase was crucial for
the observed differences between effect-compatible and effect-
incompatible trials, or whether the association between responses
and effects, which was established during the practice phase, would
be sufficient for compatibility effects to emerge in the test phase,
even if the effects were no longer present. Disappearance of the
compatibility effect would indicate that, in our paradigm, effects
are only anticipated if they actually continue to appear after the
response. Such a result would further validate Experiment 1 by
showing that the observed effect was indeed due to the processing
of the effect information during response preparation, and not
due to the imperative stimuli or Go stimuli and their assignment
to the responses.
In Experiment 3 we explored a wider range of SOAs than in
Experiments 1 and 2. In addition, we used a larger number of
response alternatives in order to extend the duration of response
preparation, and introduced a second type of effect-incompatible
Go stimuli, which were not related to any of the response effects.
The latter variation was intended to provide more information
about facilitating and inhibiting mechanisms contributing to the
effects of compatible and incompatible Go stimuli on response
preparation.
EXPERIMENT 1
The acquisition phase consisted in a free-choice task. According
to previous experiments, the free-choice task provides optimal
conditions for response effect learning (e.g., Elsner and Hommel,
2001; Herwig et al., 2007; Pfister et al., 2010). Participants learned
that the execution of each of two key-presses was followed by a
particular effect; one of the responses produced a picture of a
car steering wheel on the computer screen, the other response a
picture of a beach ball. In the test phase, an imperative stimu-
lus defined which of the responses participants should execute.
Response execution was only to be carried out after presentation
of one of the two Go stimuli. The Go stimuli consisted either
of a picture of hands in the posture of catching a beach ball or
hands in the posture of holding a steering wheel (Figure 1). Obvi-
ously, the hands in the posture of holding a steering wheel were
compatible with the steering wheel and incompatible with the
beach ball and vice versa. The question was: would the effect com-
patibility of the Go stimuli affect the RTs? Effect-compatible Go
stimuli should support the activation of the effect codes, effect-
incompatible Go stimuli should interfere with the activation of
the effect codes.
METHOD
Participants
Forty-two undergraduate students from the Department of Psy-
chology at the University of Sunderland served as participants.
All students were first-year students and received course credit
for their participation. Their mean age was 21.3 years (SD= 4.9).
Thirty-five of the participants were female, nine male. Participants
had either normal or corrected to normal vision. Ethical approval
was obtained from the departmental ethics committee.
Material and apparatus
Stimulus presentation and response recording were controlled by
a standard PC. The computer was situated in a sound-proof booth.
In the acquisition phase of the experiment the letter O was pre-
sented in the middle of the computer screen. Responses consisted
of a key-press with either the left or right index finger. Partici-
pants were instructed to use the X-key of a standard QWERTY
keyboard with their left index finger and the M-key with their
right index finger. Both fingers were located on the corresponding
keys throughout the experiment. After a left key-press a picture of
a steering wheel appeared in the middle of the computer screen.
After a right key-press a picture of a beach ball was presented as
response effect (see Figure 1).
In the test phase, a yellow square required a response with the
left index finger and a yellow triangle a response with the right
index finger. Two hands in the posture of holding a steering wheel
and two hands in the posture of catching a beach ball were used
as Go stimuli. A No-Go trial was indicated by two hands with the
palms turned outwards (see Figure 1 for illustration of the Go
and No-Go stimuli). The high similarity between Go and No-Go
stimuli forced the participants to identify these stimuli if they did
not want to produce a high number of false alarms in the No-Go
trials.
Design and procedure
The experiment was divided into two phases: an acquisition phase
and a test phase. In the acquisition phase the participants per-
formed a free-choice reaction task. Upon presentation of an “O” in
the middle of the screen participants were asked to perform either
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FIGURE 1 | Material and design used in Experiment 1.The SOA was 0, 100, or 200 ms.
a left or a right key-press depending on their choice. They were
instructed to use both key-presses with about the same frequency.
The key-press deleted the “O” from the screen and triggered the
presentation of the response effect. After a left key-press the steer-
ing wheel appeared on the screen whereas the right key-press was
always followed by the beach ball. The effect stimuli remained
on the screen for 1500 ms. After an inter trial interval (ITI) of
500 ms the next trial began with the presentation of the “O.” The
acquisition phase consisted of 100 trials. After 50 trials and at the
end of the acquisition phase participants were informed about the
frequency of their use of each key.
The subsequent test phase was designed as a forced-choice reac-
tion task. Each trial started with the presentation of a “+” sign
for 1000 ms followed by the imperative stimulus, either a square
or a triangle, which determined the response. Participants were
instructed to withhold the response until the presentation of a Go
stimulus, after which they should execute the correct response as
quickly as possible. In case of the No-Go stimulus participants
should not respond. The pictures of the two hands constituting
the Go or No-Go stimulus appeared on the left and right sight of
the imperative stimulus. The SOA between the onset of the imper-
ative stimulus and the onset of the Go stimulus was either 0, 100,
or 200 ms. Immediately after a correct response, the effect stimulus
assigned to that response replaced the imperative stimulus and the
Go signal. As in the acquisition phase, the effect stimulus remained
on the screen for 1500 ms and, after an ITI of 500 ms, the next trial
started with the “+” sign. In the case of an incorrect response,
instead of the effect stimulus appearing, the word “incorrect” was
presented for 1500 ms. No-Go trails were terminated after 2000 ms
by the presentation of a blank screen for 500 ms. If participants
performed a response in No-Go trials the response was followed
by a written reminder that they should not respond in such trials.
The most important independent variable of the experiment
consisted of the construction of the Go trials. Both imperative
stimuli could be followed by both Go stimuli. This meant there
was no fixed relationship between the two Go stimuli and the
two responses. However, because there was a fixed relationship
between responses and effect stimuli, in half of the Go trials the
Go stimuli were compatible with the response effect and in the
other half incompatible (cf. Figure 1).
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Altogether the test phase consisted of 360 trials, divided into
six blocks of 60 trials with short rest periods between blocks. Of
all trials, 80% were Go trials and 20%were No-Go trials. The three
SOAs were applied with equal frequencies to Go and No-Go trials.
All experimental conditions were randomly mixed across the test
phase. Responses and RTs were measured from the onset of the
Go stimulus. Figure 1 summarises the experimental procedure.
Including the acquisition phase the complete experiment lasted
about 50 min.
RESULTS
The aim of the acquisition phase was plainly to familiarize the
participants with the response effects. There was no further data
analysis. The data of interest regarding our research question were
collected in the Go trials of the test phase. Only RTs from correct
responses were taken into account. RTs longer than 2000 ms were
considered as outliers. Overall, only 3.6% of all responses in Go
trials were erroneous responses or outliers.
Individual mean RTs for each participant were calculated
depending on the SOAs and the effect compatibility of the Go stim-
uli. The individual means were subjected to a 3 (SOA)× 2 (com-
patibility) repeated-measures Analysis of Variance (ANOVA).
In this and all following analyses, sphericity was tested for all
repeated-measures factors with more than two levels. If sphericity
could not be assumed, the degrees of freedom and subsequently the
p-values were corrected using the Greenhouse–Geisser correction.
Figure 2 presents the mean RTs for all experimental condi-
tions. The ANOVA yielded a significant main effect of the SOA,
F(2, 82)= 308.71, p< 0.001, η2p = 0.88. Whereas at the 0 ms
SOA the mean RT was 612 ms, at the longest SOA of 200 ms the
RTs were about 135 ms shorter. This indicates that participants
used the SOA interval to prepare the response. More importantly,
there was also a significant compatibility effect, F(1, 41)= 5.14,
p= 0.029, η2p = 0.11. If the Go stimulus was compatible with the
effect of the to-be-prepared response, RTs were on average 9 ms
faster than in the incompatible condition. According to Cohen
(1988), η2p = 0.11 indicates a medium effect size. This is first evi-
dence for an activation of effect codes during preparation of the
motor response. The interaction between both variables was not
significant, F(2, 82)= 0.06, p= 0.946, η2p = 0.001.
Given numerically small compatibility effect we checked care-
fully if this difference could be explained by a speed-accuracy
trade-off. However, this was not the case. An ANOVA conducted
on the number of correct responses only found a significant
effect of SOA, F(2, 82)= 11.77, p< 0.001, η2p = 0.22. The num-
ber of correct responses increased with the prolonged SOA from
94.5 to 97.2%. However, there was no effect of compatibility,
F(1, 41)= 0.56, p= 0.460, η2p = 0.01. On average, 95.9% of
the responses in compatible trials were correct. For incompatible
trials the figure increased to 96.3%. There was also no interac-
tion between SOA and compatibility, F(2, 82)= 1.34, p= 0.268,
η2p = 0.03. Therefore, we can exclude a speed-accuracy trade-off
as a cause for the compatibility effect observed in the RT data.
In a further step of the analysis we checked the participants’
false alarm rates (i.e., responses in No-Go trials). A high num-
ber of false alarms indicates that the participant did not follow
the instructions and did not distinguish the Go stimuli from the
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FIGURE 2 | Mean reaction times depending on SOA and compatibility
conditions in Experiment 1. Error bars in this and all following graphs
represent the standard error of the means calculated for the
within-participant design following the procedure suggested by Cousineau
(2005).
No-Go stimulus. In that case the compatibility effect should disap-
pear. On average the false alarm rate amounted to 17.46%, i.e., on
average in 12.6 out of the 72 No-Go trials a response was wrongly
executed. The inter-individual variance was large. Whereas 29 par-
ticipants showed false alarms in less than 20% of the No-Go trials,
some of the remaining 13 participants had false alarm rates of
40% and above, and one participant responded in all No-Go tri-
als. Therefore, we recalculated the compatibility effects separately
for participants with less than 20% false alarms (low false alarm
rate) and participant with more than 20% false alarms (high false
alarm rate; Figure 3).
A 3× 2× 2 ANOVA with SOA (0, 100, 200 ms) and com-
patibility (compatible/incompatible) as within-participant factors
and the false alarm rate (low/high) as between-participants factor
revealed that the effect of false alarm rates was significant, F(1,
40)= 18.44, p< 0.001, η2p = 0.32. Participants with a high false
alarm rate responded considerably faster (mean RT= 458 ms)
than participants with a low false alarm rate (mean RT= 584 ms).
This underlines our assumption that participants with a high false
alarm rate did not wait until they had fully identified the Go signal
before they performed their response. As expected, the compat-
ibility effect depended on the false alarm rate, F(1, 40)= 4.34,
p= 0.044, η2p = 0.10. Participants with a low false alarm rate
showed a compatibility effect of 14 ms, and those with a high false
alarm rate did not show any compatibility effect (their responses to
compatible trials were on average 3 ms slower than their responses
to incompatible trials). Apart from the main effect of false alarm
rates and the interaction of false alarm rates with compatibility,
only the main effect of SOA was significant, F(2, 80)= 261.79,
p< 0.001, η2p = 0.87. The main effect of compatibility did not
reach significance, F(1, 40)= 1.92, p= 0.174, η2p = 0.05. All other
interactions were not significant (F-values< 1).
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FIGURE 3 | Mean reaction times depending on SOA and compatibility
conditions in Experiment 1.The left graph shows the result for
participants with a low rate of false alarms (less than 20% responses in
No-Go trials), the right graph for participants with a high rate of false alarms
(more than 20% responses in No-Go trials).
In a further analysis, we tested if the compatibility effect devel-
oped with practice. To this end, we split the test phase in two
halves. Only the data of the participants with a low false alarm rate
were taken into account and were entered into a 2 (halves)× 3
(SOAs)× 2 (compatibility) ANOVA. We found a main effect of
practice, F(1, 32)= 54.51, p< 0.001, η2p = 0.63. Responses in the
second half were 79 ms faster than responses in the first half. Also
the main effect of SOA, F(2, 64)= 238.01, p< 0.001, η2p = 0.88,
and the main effect of compatibility could be confirmed, F(1,
32)= 8.40, p= 0.007, η2p = 0.21 (large effect size according to
Cohen, 1988). However, none of the interactions was significant.
Most importantly, the compatibility effect was not affected by
practice, F(1, 32)= 2.27, p= 0.14, η2p = 0.07. There was no evi-
dence for an increase of the compatibility effect from the first to the
second half. On the contrary, numerically the compatibility effect
was larger in the first half of the test phase (18 ms) as compared
to the second half (7 ms). For all other interactions the F-values
were <1.
DISCUSSION
Experiment 1 clearly shows that the Go stimuli affected the
preparation of the responses depending on their compatibility
with the response effects. As long as participants had sufficiently
processed the Go stimuli before executing the response, their
RTs in effect-compatible trials were significantly shorter than in
effect-incompatible trials. The compatibility effect disappeared for
participants who ignored the Go stimuli. It is important to remem-
ber that the Go stimuli itself did not have any relationship to the
two responses. Both stimuli appeared with equal frequency for
each of the two responses. What made the Go stimuli compatible
or incompatible was only their relationship to stimuli appearing
after the execution of the responses. Therefore, the compatibility
effect can only be explained by assuming that participants antic-
ipated the effects of their responses during response preparation.
Only if effect codes were active before response execution the com-
patibility between the Go stimuli and the future effects could affect
the RTs. Consequently, dropping the effects in an additional exper-
iment should abolish the compatibility effect. This was tested in
Experiment 2.
In the experiment we could only find a main effect of SOA,
confirming that participants indeed prepared the response dur-
ing the SOA. The imperative stimuli informed the participants
about the required response, and they used the time until pre-
sentation of the Go stimulus for response selection and pro-
gramming. However, contrary to our original expectations, the
SOA did not affect the compatibility effect. The compatibility
effect did neither decrease nor increase with increasing SOA.
Whereas a decrease of the compatibility effect would have indi-
cated the involvement of effect anticipation in response selection,
an increase of the compatibility effect would have supported the
assumption that effects were anticipated for an already selected
response. Both expectations were not confirmed by the data. A
preliminary explanation might be that the present, rather sim-
ple task was not sensitive enough to provoke any interaction
between SOA and compatibility. We therefore tested this further
in Experiment 3.
A further interesting result was that practice during the test
phase did not increase the compatibility effect. Apparently, then,
the compatibility effect was fully developed from the beginning of
the test phase. This supports the idea that the effect is based on the
response effect relations as learned in the acquisition phase and
not on relations that are only present in the test phase, such as the
relationship between the imperative stimulus and the Go stimulus
or between the Go stimulus and the response.
EXPERIMENT 2
With the second experiment we wanted to assess whether the
presence of the response effects in the test phase was cru-
cial for the observed differences between effect-compatible and
effect-incompatible trials. Alternatively, the association between
responses and effects that was established during the practice
phase might be sufficient for compatibility effects to emerge in
the test phase, even if the effects are no longer present. We pre-
dicted that the compatibility effect would disappear when effects
are no longer presented in the test phase. This result would further
validate Experiment 1 by showing that the results were indeed due
to the processing of the effect information during response prepa-
ration and not, e.g., to the imperative stimuli or Go stimuli and
their assignment to the responses.
METHOD
Participants
Thirty-six undergraduate students (29 female, 7 male) from the
Department of Psychology at the University of Sunderland took
part in the experiment. Participants had a mean age of 20.9 years
(SD= 3.4). All participants received course credit for their partic-
ipation. They had either normal or corrected to normal vision.
Ethical approval was obtained from the departmental ethics
committee.
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Material and apparatus
These were identical to Experiment 1.
Design and procedure
The acquisition phase was the same as in Experiment 1. In the test
phase, the only change consisted in the replacement of the effect
stimuli by the word “correct.” Incorrect responses were followed
by the word “incorrect.”
RESULTS
Data were analyzed in the same way as for Experiment 1. Two
of the participants exhibited exceptionally high error rates (about
50%, indicating random responses), and their data were thus dis-
carded from the analysis. The remaining 34 participants exhibited
an error rate of 3.7% which corresponds to the error rate in Exper-
iment 1. The mean false alarm rate for the 34 participants was
10.17%. Only one participant had a false alarm rate above 20%,
and we decided to also discard this participant’s data so that only
those participants were included for which a compatibility effect
would be most likely to occur. Figure 4 shows the mean RTs for
effect-compatible and incompatible trials for each SOA.
Data were subjected to a 3 (SOA)× 2 (compatibility) ANOVA.
The analysis only confirmed a significant effect of the SOA, F(2,
64)= 140.98, p< 0.001, η2p = 0.82. As in the first experiment, RTs
decreased with the prolonged SOA. The RT difference between
the 0 and the 200 ms SOA amounted to 124 ms. As expected,
no significant effect of compatibility was found, F(1, 32)= 0.22,
p= 0.643, η2p = 0.01. Also the interaction between both variables
was not significant,F(2, 64)= 1.94,p= 0.152,η2p = 0.06. On aver-
age, for compatible trials responses were just 2 ms faster than for
incompatible trials. Separate paired-samples t -tests for the three
SOAs did not find any significant differences, 0 ms: t (32)= 0.28,
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FIGURE 4 | Mean reaction times depending on SOA and compatibility
conditions in Experiment 2. Compatibility is defined in relation to the
response effects presented in the acquisition phase for each of the
responses.
p= 0.779, 100 ms: t (32)= 1.25, p= 0.220, 200 ms: t (32)= 1.72,
p= 0.095.
In an additional analysis we split the test phase into two halves
in order to identify a possible residual compatibility effect at the
beginning of the test phase. The three-way ANOVA (test half, com-
patibility, SOA) only confirmed the results regarding compatibility
and SOA reported above. Most importantly, there was no interac-
tion between half and compatibility, F(1, 32)= 0.004, p= 0.950,
η2p = 0.88 < 0.001. In fact, the difference between compatible
and incompatible trials was only about 2 ms in both halves of the
experiment.
DISCUSSION
Experiment 2 clearly confirms that the compatibility effect
observed in Experiment 1 depended on the response effects. It
only occurred in Experiment 1 where the response effects were
present, but not in Experiment 2 where the differentiating effect
stimuli were replaced by a single effect, the word “correct.” Up to
response execution, everything was exactly the same in both exper-
iments. Therefore, we can be very certain that the compatibility
effect in Experiment 1 was not caused by any unknown relation-
ship between the imperative stimuli, Go stimuli, and responses.
This underlines that the compatibility effect observed in Experi-
ment 1 is reliable evidence for the activation of effect codes during
the preparation of a motor response.
We did not find any evidence that the compatibility effect would
fade out in course of the test phase. The compatibility of the Go
stimuli with the originally learned response effects did not affect
the RTs from the beginning of the test phase. There was not even a
numerical difference of the compatibility effects in the first and the
second half of the test phase. Even when we only analyzed the first
30 responses of the test phase, no hint of a compatibility effect was
found. Unfortunately, however, it is impossible to get reliable data
for such small parts of the test phase because the number of rep-
etitions per condition becomes too low. Within the first 30 trials
there were only four responses per condition for each participant,
and some of these data were missing due to errors and delayed
responses. These factors might have obscured a possible residual
compatibility effect at the beginning of the test phase. Neverthe-
less, it appears that participants realized very quickly that their
responses only produced an unspecific effect in the test phase, and
consequently they stopped anticipating the specific effects learned
in the test phase.
The missing compatibility effect in Experiment 2 questions the
interpretation of experiments in which the response effects did
not appear after the responses in the test phase. For example,
in Elsner and Hommel’s (2001) experiments as described above,
the response effects were used as imperative stimuli in the test
phase, but after the response no effect was presented. If partici-
pants stop anticipating effects if these effects are no longer appear
after the response (as indicated by the present experiment), than
the observed advantage of effect-compatible stimulus-response
mappings might require a different interpretation. In another
experiment, Cardoso-Leite et al. (2011) presented in half of the
trials in the test phase no effects, and in the other half the effect
stimuli appeared randomly after the responses. Their test phase
was designed as detection task, and participants had to report if an
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effect stimulus was presented after the response. The authors found
reduced sensitivity for response effects learned in the acquisition
phase and explained this by effect anticipation; sensitivity for the
expected stimulus is reduced, whereas the unexpected stimulus
requires further processing. However, an alternative interpreta-
tion might be that participants stopped anticipating the previously
learned effects and tried to learn and anticipate the new response
effects, which could not be successful because of the random
response effect assignment. The attempt to learn new effects might
go along with the suppression of the old effects resulting in the
reduced sensitivity.
EXPERIMENT 3
In Experiment 1 we did not find any interaction between the SOA
and the compatibility effect. As already mentioned, this might
have been due to the simplicity of the task with just two responses.
Under such conditions selection of responses and activation of
effect codes might go too fast to find a compatibility× SOA inter-
action with our paradigm. In Experiment 3 we therefore used a
more complex task with four responses and four effects. The larger
number of response alternatives should slow down response selec-
tion and prolong the preparation period. In addition we extended
the duration of the SOA up to 450 ms.
The second aim of Experiment 3 was to investigate the mech-
anisms that induce the compatibility effect in greater detail. The
difference between compatible and incompatible trials could be
caused by a facilitation of the response in compatible trials, an
inhibition of the response in incompatible trials, or both. To differ-
entiate between these alternatives, we introduced a new variation
of the effect-incompatible Go stimuli: There were incompati-
ble Go stimuli related to one of the response effects (incom-
patible/related) as in Experiment 1, as well as incompatible Go
stimuli that had no relationship to any of the response effects
(incompatible/unrelated). Assuming that the Go stimulus acti-
vates its corresponding representation in memory, in compati-
ble trials the Go stimulus would activate a representation that
is compatible with the anticipated response effect. In incom-
patible trials the Go stimulus would either activate a stimulus
representation that is compatible with the effects of an alterna-
tive response (incompatible/related) or a stimulus representation
which does not have any relationship to one of the response effects
(incompatible/unrelated).
According to the ideomotor principle activation of effect codes
leads to an automatic activation of the responses to produce these
effects. Therefore, for compatible trials the compatible Go stimulus
should eventually facilitate the response activation via the effect,
while incompatible/related Go stimuli should result in the acti-
vation of competing responses and inhibit the required response.
Compared to that, incompatible/unrelated Go stimuli should not
facilitate or inhibit a competing response via the response effects.
Hence, RTs should be shortest in compatible trials and longest in
incompatible trials with incompatible/related Go stimuli, whereas
incompatible/unrelated Go stimuli should result in intermediate
RTs, due to reduced or absent response competition.
No difference between related and unrelated incompatible Go
stimuli would be expected if there was only facilitation in compat-
ible trials but no inhibition in incompatible trials. In both types
of incompatible trials the Go stimulus would activate its represen-
tation in memory. However, that would not further activate codes
of a related response effect in the case of incompatible/related Go
stimuli and therefore would not lead to response competition.
In addition, we used Experiment 3 to test our paradigm fur-
ther. Whereas in Experiment 1 objects were used as effects and
hand postures as Go stimuli, in Experiment 3 hand postures were
the effects, while objects were used as Go stimuli. If we found
compatibility effects equivalent to Experiment 1, then we can con-
clude that these effects do not depend on the particular sequence
of the Go and effect stimuli. Note also that the particular setting
might increase the size of compatibility effect since, in line with
the affordance concept (Gibson, 1979; Tucker and Ellis, 1998), the
presentation of the objects as Go stimuli would activate the actions
depicted in the effect stimuli.
METHOD
Participants
Thirty undergraduate students of psychology at Liverpool Hope
University took part in the experiment. Their mean age was
22.1 years (SD= 4.1). Fifteen of the participants were male and 15
female. Participants received course credit for their participation.
Participants had either normal or corrected to normal vision. The
experiment was approved by the departmental ethics committee.
Material and apparatus
Participants had to choose between four responses. These were
key-presses with the left and right middle and index fingers. The
fingers were placed on the keys “Z,” “X,” “N,” and “M” on a stan-
dard QWERTY keyboard. Response effects were pictures of a right
hand in the position of holding a coffee mug, a computer mouse, a
pen, and a spoon assigned to the left middle finger, left index finger,
right index finger, and right middle finger, respectively. In all cases,
the hand was only shown without the corresponding objects. In the
test phase the corresponding pictures of a coffee mug, a computer
mouse, a pencil, and a spoon served as Go stimuli. Whereas these
four Go stimuli had a relationship to one of the aforementioned
hand postures, a fifth Go stimulus was a picture of a hand brush,
which did not fit with any of the effect stimuli (see Figure 5). The
No-Go stimulus was a picture of a hammer. As imperative stimuli
in the test phase little squares in the colors orange, green, red, and
blue were assigned in order to the left middle finger, left index
finger, right index finger, and right middle finger.
Design and procedure
Basically, design and procedure of Experiment 3 were identical to
that for Experiment 1. The acquisition and test phases followed
exactly the same pattern as described above. There were again
only 100 acquisition trials. That is, participants experienced on
average only 25 instances of each response effect pairing. In the
test phase, the colored squares served as imperative stimuli and
the SOA between imperative stimulus and Go stimulus was 0, 150,
300, or 450 ms. The imperative stimuli (colored squares) were not
occluded by the Go stimulus but stayed in the foreground. No-Go
trials were indicated by the picture of a hammer. The No-Go stim-
ulus always appeared after 600 ms in order to reduce the number
of trials. All other details were identical to Experiment 1. Figure 5
illustrates the procedure.
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FIGURE 5 | Material and design of Experiment 3. Cup, mouse, pen, and
spoon are related to one of the hand postures used as effect stimuli. The
pictures were used as compatible and incompatible Go stimuli. The hand
brush is unrelated to all effect stimuli and was therefore incompatible to all of
them. LM, left middle finger; LI, left index finger; RI, right index finger; RM,
right middle finger. The SOA was 0, 150, 300, or 450 ms.
In the Go trials, three types of Go stimuli were used. Go stim-
uli were either compatible with the effect (e.g., response with the
left finger to produce a hand holding a coffee mug – picture of
a coffee mug is a compatible Go stimulus), incompatible/related
(e.g., response with the left finger to produce a hand holding a
coffee mug – picture of a pencil is an incompatible Go stimulus,
but related to the response with the right index finger producing a
hand holding a pencil), or incompatible/unrelated (e.g., response
with the left finger to produce a hand holding a coffee mug –
picture of a hand brush is an incompatible Go stimulus that is
unrelated to all effect pictures used in the experiment). In prin-
ciple, four incompatible Go trials could have been generated, one
with the hand brush and three with objects that corresponded to
the effects of the other three responses. However, we decided not
to use all possible combinations to avoid a bias in the experiment.
If, on the one hand, all responses were combined with all Go stim-
uli with the same frequency, this had left us with 20% compatible
trials and 80% incompatible trials, and the low frequency of com-
patible trials had likely worked against the compatibility effect. If,
on the other hand, we had designed 50% of the trials as compatible
and 50% as incompatible, each object picture had been combined
more often with the response followed by the compatible effect
than with all other responses. For compatible trials the Go stim-
ulus had then biased the selection of the correct response, which
had made it impossible to explain RT differences in terms of com-
patibility effects. Therefore, we limited the possible combinations
of Go stimuli with the responses so that for each response there
was exactly one compatible Go stimulus, one incompatible/related
Go stimulus, and one incompatible/unrelated Go stimulus. For
example, for a response with the left index finger only the coffee
mug (effect-compatible), the pencil (effect-incompatible, related
to the effect of the response with the right middle finger) and
the brush (incompatible, unrelated to any of the other response
effects) served as Go stimuli with equal frequency. In turn, for
responses with the right index finger the coffee mug was the
incompatible/related Go stimulus and the pencil the compatible
stimulus. Following this design each of the four effect-related Go
stimuli appeared with equal frequency for one response as effect-
compatible Go stimulus and for another response as incompatible
stimulus. The hand brush, as unrelated effect-incompatible Go
stimulus, was used with the same frequency for all four responses.
The test phase consisted of 600 trials, with 480 Go trials and
120 No-Go trials. Among the Go trials, 160 trials were effect-
compatible and 320 effect-incompatible (160 for each type of
incompatible Go stimuli). All types of Go trials were presented
at each SOA (0, 150, 300, 450 ms). Go trials and No-Go trials were
randomly mixed. The full experiment lasted about 75 min.
RESULTS
Data from the acquisition phase were analyzed in order to check
if participants had about the same learning experience with all
responses and their effects. Given the total number of 100 trials,
each response should have been executed 25 times. For each par-
ticipant we calculated a response-use index, which was defined
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as the sum of the squared differences between 25 and the actual
use for each of the four responses. An index of 0 would indicate
that all responses had been used exactly 25 times. Indices var-
ied between 20 and 1208. Whereas the small index of 20 showed
that this participant deviated only by two to three responses from
the ideal of 25 for each response, the highest index was due to
using one of the responses only two times and another one 48
times. The mean response-use index was 182.1 (SD= 217.4). We
decided to discard the two participants with the highest indices
(1208 and 454) from the analysis since both had only rarely used
at least one of the responses. In the test phase, the numbers of
false alarms and erroneous responses were relatively low so that
no other participants had to be excluded from further analysis:
on average participants responded in 14.2% of the No-Go trials.
Including outliers (RTs above 2000 ms) only 7.3% of the responses
were erroneous responses.
In analyzing the data of the test phase, first the number of
correct responses per participant and condition was subjected
to a 4 (SOAs)× 3 (compatibility conditions) repeated-measures
ANOVA. There was only a significant main effect of SOA, F(3,
81)= 5.96, p= 0.001, η2p = 0.18, indicating that the number of
correct responses increased with longer SOAs (Figure 6). For
effect-compatible trials, the number of correct responses was
slightly higher than for incompatible trials. The lowest number
of correct responses was observed for incompatible/unrelated tri-
als (hand brush as Go stimulus). However, the compatibility effect
was not significant, F(2, 54)= 1.30, p= 0.280, η2p = 0.05, nor was
the interaction between SOA and compatibility, F(6, 162)= 0.12,
p= 0.994, η2p = 0.004.
In a second step the RTs were analyzed. As in the previous analy-
ses, we split the experiment into two halves to check for possible
practice effects on the RTs (see Figure 7).
The individual means per experimental condition were entered
into a 2 (halves)× 4 (SOAs)× 3 (compatibility conditions)
repeated-measures ANOVA. Practice from first to second half
led to a small, significant facilitation of responses by 31 ms,
F(1, 27)= 4.50, p= 0.043, η2p = 0.14. There was also a signifi-
cant effect of SOA, F(3, 81)= 391.22, p< 0.001, η2p = 0.94. As
in the first two experiments, and in line with the error analy-
sis above, the responses became not only more accurate but
also faster with increasing SOA. At the 450 ms SOA responses
were 289 ms faster as compared to the 0 ms SOA. Again, this
reflects that participants used the SOA to prepare the response.
The SOA effect was 35 ms smaller in the second half as con-
firmed by the significant interaction between SOA and the halves
of the experiment, F(3, 81)= 2.94, p= 0.038, η2p = 0.1. Most
importantly, we found a significant effect of compatibility, F(2,
54)= 8.45, p= 0.001, η2p = 0.24 (large effect size according to
Cohen, 1988). Pairwise comparisons using the Bonferroni cor-
rection revealed that RTs under the effect-compatible condition
were significantly shorter than under both incompatible condi-
tions (incompatible/related: difference= 19 ms,p= 0.026; incom-
patible/unrelated: difference= 25 ms, p< 0.001). The difference
between the two incompatible conditions was not significant,
p> 0.999. Thus, as in Experiment 1, the relationship between
Go signal and response effect clearly modulated the RTs. Taking
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FIGURE 7 | Mean reaction times depending on SOA and compatibility
in Experiment 3.The data are shown separately for the first half of the test
phase (left graph) and the second half of the test phase (right graph).
the analysis of the number of correct responses into account we
can exclude a speed-accuracy trade-off in explaining the observed
difference. However, similar to Experiment 1, the compatibility
effect did not depend on the SOA, F(6, 162)= 0.09, p= 0.997,
η2p = 0.003. Furthermore, the compatibility effect did not change
with practice, F(2, 54)= 0.41, p= 0.665, η2p = 0.02. The numer-
ical data in Figure 7 suggest that in the second half of the
experiment the compatibility effect increased with increasing SOA.
However, this was not confirmed by the statistical analysis as
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the three-way interaction was not significant, F(6, 162)= 0.36,
p= 0.905, η2p = 0.01. Also a separate ANOVA for the second half
of the test phase did not reveal an interaction between compatibil-
ity and SOA,F(6, 162)= 0.21,p= 0.972,η2p = 0.01. Only the main
effects of compatibility, F(2, 54)= 3.24, p= 0.047, η2p = 0.11, and
of SOA, F(3, 81)= 156.67, p< 0.001, η2p = 0.85, were significant.
DISCUSSION
The third experiment demonstrates three important points: First,
the compatibility effect between the Go stimulus and the response
effect, as observed in Experiment 1, did not depend on the spe-
cific stimulus material. Under more complex conditions, and using
different stimuli, we have observed the same effect again. Whereas
we had originally expected a larger compatibility effect than in
Experiment 1, this was not the case. This might be due to the fact
that with the chosen design we had partially worked against an
increase of the compatibility effect. Compatible trials had a lower
frequency than incompatible trials (one-third against two-thirds
of trials) whereas in Experiment 1 compatible and incompatible
trials were equally frequent.
Second, also under the more complex conditions and extended
SOAs, the compatibility effect was not affected by the SOA. This
does not correspond to our original predictions. However, the
present results make it unlikely that effect anticipation is the pre-
requisite for response selection, at least under the conditions of our
experiment. Had this been the case, then in particular early com-
patible Go stimuli should have facilitated the responses, and the
compatibility effect should have decreased with increasing SOA.
The data do not show any tendency for such a pattern.
Third, it is important to note that there was no difference
between the two types of incompatible trials. This indicates that
only compatible Go stimuli facilitated the anticipation of the
response effect, but incompatible Go stimuli did not seem to
inhibit the anticipation of the effect or to activate competing
responses. We assume that the representations activated by the
Go stimuli do not directly activate representations of correspond-
ing response effects. However, if representations of the response
effects are anticipated depending on a selected response, compat-
ible Go stimuli might contribute to further activation of these
representations whereas incompatible Go stimuli remain without
effect. This resembles very much our findings with the flanker
task (Ziessler and Nattkemper, 2002, 2011; Ziessler et al., 2004).
Compared to neutral stimuli, the presentation of response effects
flanking the imperative stimulus facilitated the response only if
the flanking stimuli were the effect of the required response. But
also in that study, no inhibition was found when the effects of
competing responses were presented.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The present experiments provide evidence for effect anticipation
using a new paradigm that does not require the presentation of
the effects itself in the planning phase of the response. Participants
were instructed to prepare a particular response, but to withhold
its execution until the stimulus configuration would allow it. This
is a relatively natural situation. Very often we are prepared to do
something, but we have to wait for the suitable conditions before
we can actually do it, for example waiting for the green traffic light
before we can move the car forward. In the present experiments
the execution conditions were defined by Go stimuli. The Go stim-
uli themselves had no relationship to the responses. Therefore, if
the selection of a response and its preparation would depend only
on the stimuli presented before response execution, the Go stim-
uli should not make any difference between the responses and
should not affect response execution. In contrast to this assump-
tion, Experiments 1 and 3 showed that events which occurred
after the execution of the response also played a role in the reac-
tion time interval. Depending on their relationship to the learned
effects of the responses, the Go stimuli were either compatible or
incompatible with the given response. The small, but consistent
RT differences between effect-compatible and incompatible trials
can only be explained by assuming that the Go stimuli interacted
with the effect codes. In other words, effect codes must have been
active in advance of response execution. Thus, we have found clear
evidence for effect anticipation as part of response preparation
without presenting the effects themselves during response prepa-
ration and also without any feature overlap between responses and
effects.
Interestingly, in the present experiments the effects were com-
pletely irrelevant for the responses. In the test phases the identity
of the required response was fully determined by the imperative
stimulus. Participants could execute fast and accurate responses
without taking the effects into account. However, the results show
that the response effects were anticipated. Apparently, the antic-
ipation of effects is a very basic process. When we plan a motor
response or motor action we anticipate the effects that the response
or action will cause in the environment, at least if the effects are
attended to (Ziessler et al., 2004).
The experiments also show that the cognitive systems associ-
ated with response planning are very flexible in learning response
effects and in applying this knowledge in motor control. The effects
that we examined in the present experiments were completely arbi-
trary. A small number of acquisition trials was sufficient to create
response effect relations that affected the RTs in the following test
phase. In Experiment 3 participants had only about 25 repeti-
tions of each response for acquiring the response effects in the
acquisition phase. Note that the participants were not explicitly
instructed to learn the effects. Nevertheless, we found compati-
bility effects early on in the test phase and, as the comparisons
between the first and second half of the test phase indicated, these
compatibility effects did not increase with further practice. Thus,
on the one hand it seems that participants learn response effect
relations very quickly (see also Wolfensteller and Ruge, 2011). On
the other hand, our experiments also show that participants drop
their response effect knowledge immediately if the effects are no
longer valid. In Experiment 2, participants were given the same
opportunity as participants in Experiment 1 to learn the response
effects. However, in the test phase they clearly did no longer antic-
ipate the learned effects after they detected that the effects would
not appear after the responses.
The compatibility effect did not interact with the SOA. Origi-
nally we had expected that the compatibility effect should either
decrease or increase with the SOA between the imperative stimulus
and the Go stimulus. The data show that this was not the case. In
Experiments 1 and 3 the compatibility effect was very stable over
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the SOA variation. Only the second half of the test phase of Exper-
iment 3 showed a numerical increase of the compatibility effect
with the SOA. However, this increase was not statistically signifi-
cant. In two additional experiments not reported here we repeated
Experiments 1 and 3 without the acquisition phase. Participants
could only learn the response effects in the test phase. The idea
behind this variation was that the process of effect anticipation
might change with increasing practice from a more goal-oriented
to a more stimulus-driven mode (Ruge et al., 2012). Thus, after
extensive practice participants might just respond to the stimuli
but not use effect anticipation for response control. The results
confirmed that participants learned the effects very quickly. How-
ever, also if the participants could only learn the response effects in
the test phase, the compatibility effect did not depend on the SOA.
There are two ways to interpret the general stability of our com-
patibility effects across different SOAs. First, it could be assumed
that response selection in the present experiments indeed required
the activation of effect codes as assumed by strong versions of
the ideomotor theory. Following this approach, response selec-
tion occurs through the activation of effect codes (Lotze, 1852;
Harleß, 1861; Hommel et al., 2001). Effect codes would then be
activated early in the process and would remain active through-
out response preparation. Consequently, the Go stimulus in our
paradigm could in principle interact with the anticipated effect
at all SOAs. However, one might expect the strongest compati-
bility effects for the shortest SOA, that is, when imperative and
Go stimuli are presented together: In this case the presentation
of an effect-compatible Go stimulus could prime the anticipation
of the response effect and facilitate the response as observed in
Experiment 3. Figure 8A illustrates this scenario.
Whilst this explanation works very well for the short SOAs,
it is more difficult to explain why the compatibility effect would
not decrease at longer SOAs: when the effect codes are already
fully activated and responses are selected, the impact of the Go
stimulus should become weaker. One way to explain compatibil-
ity effects at longer SOAs within this first framework might be to
assume an additional mechanism: Based on the anticipated effect,
participants might facilitate the processing of effect-compatible
Go stimuli presented at long SOAs, compared to trials where the
Go stimulus is different from the predicted. This means, not only
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would the Go stimulus prime effect anticipation, but also the antic-
ipated effect would prime the processing of the effect-compatible
Go stimulus.
A second explanation assumes that effects are anticipated based
on an already selected response. Figure 8B illustrates this sce-
nario, which is also supported by a number of findings in other
experiments. Using a flanker task, we found evidence that effect
codes were activated about 150–300 ms after presentation of the
imperative stimulus (Ziessler and Nattkemper, 2011). In these
experiments the effects of the response were presented as flank-
ing stimuli together with the imperative stimulus. The strongest
flanker effects were found if the effect flankers followed the imper-
ative stimulus whereas effect flankers presented in advance of
the imperative stimulus had no effect. Further, Nikolaev et al.
(2008) could confirm the assumption that effect anticipation
takes place after response selection using event related poten-
tials (ERPs) in the same paradigm. In their experiment, ERPs
evoked by effect-incompatible flankers differed from those evoked
by other flankers in an early perceptual component indicating
an inhibition of perceptual representations incompatible with the
response, and in later components related to stimulus evaluation
and response detection. In addition, the time difference between
the lateralized readiness potentials and the onset of the response
indicated that also the processes of motor execution were affected
by incompatible flankers.
If effects are anticipated for an already selected response, then
one might expect that, in the present experiments, the interaction
between the Go stimuli and the anticipation of the response effects
should be most pronounced at later stages of response prepara-
tion, i.e., for the longer SOAs. However, given that in the present
experiments, the Go stimulus remained on the screen until the
response key was pressed, even at short SOAs the Go stimulus
could have interacted with the anticipation of response effects at
any time before execution. In a third additional experiment not
reported here, we had therefore presented the Go stimulus for a
100 ms period only. Again, there was a main effect of compatibil-
ity, but even with this restricted duration of the Go stimulus, the
compatibility effect did not reduce at the longer SOAs. It is thus
conceivable that the present methodology does not allow to nar-
row down the precise time point at which the compatibility effects
emerge. The paradigm indeed requires that participants process
the Go stimulus and keep its representation active throughout
response preparation because this is the information indicating
that they should finally execute the key-press. If this is correct
then the Go signal could affect the anticipation of the response
effect at any stage of response preparation.
Even though both interpretations are not exclusive, we con-
sider our findings more in line with the second interpretation.
In particular the fact that the early Go stimuli did not induce
stronger effects than the late Go stimuli is difficult to align with
the idea that effect anticipation is a prerequisite of response selec-
tion. This is, of course, not an argument against the strong version
of the ideomotor principle as such. We fully agree with Herwig
et al. (2007) and Keller et al. (2006) who distinguished between
stimulus-based (“response mode”) and intention-based actions
(“intention mode”). In the intention mode, participants develop
stronger action effect bindings and might use the effects in turn to
select the actions. The test phase of our experiments was a choice
reaction task, i.e., participants were in the response mode and did
not need the response effects for response selection. Presumably
they only used the effect anticipation for subsequent processing.
This might also explain why we could not find any evidence for
effect anticipation in Experiment 2 where the response effects were
no longer presented, whereas other authors reported effect antic-
ipation without physical presence of the response effects in the
test phase. For example, Kühn et al. (2010) used a free-choice
task in both, the acquisition and the test phase. Under this con-
dition response effects learned in the acquisition phase led to
differences in brain activations in the test phase where the effects
were not presented. If we assume that participants in the free-
choice task are more likely to act in the intention mode, then
the different outcomes of their study and of our Experiment 2
become intelligible. To make sense of the free-choice task par-
ticipants begin to intend the production of one of the response
effects. This does not necessarily change when the effects do not
appear in the test phase. Therefore, with the present experiments
we do not want to exclude that the anticipation of response
effects plays a role in response selection. However, in our para-
digm the other functions of effect anticipation were likely more
prominent.
In conclusion, with the present experiments we present a new
paradigm providing more clear-cut evidence for the anticipation
of response effects during response preparation than previously
available. Effect anticipation was demonstrated via priming by
another stimulus presented during response preparation. The par-
adigm does not include any direct activation of effect codes by
external stimuli and therefore overcomes a possible objection to
earlier studies.
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